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Do physicians in fact choose the level of their own inputs and the inputs
provided by the hospital in the way described in the preceding chapter?
Do they cause the overuse of hospital inputs relative to physician inputs?
This chapter presents the results of an empirical estimation of a hospital
production function for a set of hospitals in the United States. The data
contain a measure of physician inputs, and make possible some answers
to these questions.
The Sample
A sample of 165 predominantly rural counties in 9 midwestern states
was selected. Each of these counties had just one short-term general
hospital with more than 50 beds throughout the period 1966-72. It is
reasonable to suppose that the great bulk of hospital care provided by
physicians in each county was provided at the sample hospital. The
intent was to choose approximately 50 hospitals in each of four cate-
gories: not-for-profit, 50-100 beds in 1966; governmental 50-100 beds
in 1966; not-for-profit, over 100 beds; and governmental, over 100 beds.
There was not a sufficiently large number of hospitals with reasonably
complete data in the third and fourth categories to permit 50 observa-
tions, the second category was slightly oversampled, and later editing
reduced the sample size in all categories. However, since the sample was
nonrandom to begin with, these characteristics did not seem to justify
a complex procedure of stratifying or replacing observations excluded
by editing, which would have required adding observations from non-
midwestern states. The editing consisted of removing hospitals for which
data were missing, and removing one hospital which, although classified
in 1966 as short-term, changed to long-term in subsequent years. Data
on these hospitals for 1966-72 were obtained from the American Hos-
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pital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals. In order to obtain a proxy
measure for the amount of physician input in hospitals for each of these
counties, the American Medical Association's Distribution of Physicians
data were used to list the number of patient care physicians of various
types in each county. The measure of physician input used was therefore
a measure of the number of physicians available for patient care in the
county. This was obviously not the measure of physician input most
desirable for production function estimates. However, it is the level of
input that is likely to be manipulable by policy. That is, public policy
has been and is generally directed at getting more physicians to locate
in rural areas. It is not directed at controlling the allocation of their
time. The results show what may be expected in terms of hospital out-
put by adding or removing physicians who treat their patients at that
hospital.
Hospital staff appointments are not at present a matter of public
policy, but the development of policy on such matters is not inconceiv-
able. For a single year (1972), I obtained data from the Social Security
Administration's "Provider of Services" file on the number of staff physi-
cians at each of the sample hospitals, and on a finer breakdown of
nonphysician personnel into categories. These data are provided periodi-
cally by all participating hospitals as part of the Medicare certification
program.
Functional Forms
A Cobb-Douglas function is probably the most convenient functional
form to use in estimating production functions. Whether it is appropriate
is another matter. One problem that arose in Reinhardt's study of physi-
cian input into the production of ambulatory care
1 is not present here.
In the physician's office, output can be produced even if no aides are
employed, but the Cobb-Douglas function requires that all inputs be
positive if output is to be positive. The four inputs that are used in most
of the estimates are hospital beds, nonphysician hospital personnel (full-
time equivalents), other nonlabor hospital inputs (meals, drugs, etc.)
and physicians. Each of these would appear to be essential, and each is
positive in all of the sample hospitals. Hence, the requirement of the
Cobb-Douglas form that every input be positive is not onerous. A more
serious restriction of the Cobb-Douglas form is that it constrains the
elasticity of substitution to unity. Other forms are available which do not
require this constraint, but their use raises more complex estimation
problems. Since we do not know a priori whether the Cobb-Douglas
form is reasonable or not, I have followed Feldstein in first estimating
that form, and then considering alternative specifications only if the27 Physician Influence on the Productivity of Hospitals
Cobb-Douglas form appears "unreasonable." Judgment is obviously in-
volved here.
2
When physicians or personnel are disaggregated into specialty types,
zero values for inputs do occur. Results are obtained both using the
Cobb-Douglas functional form but with a positive constant (one) added




For the cross section 1966-72, and for the pooled cross sections,
values of both beds and personnel were taken from the American Hos-
pital Association's Guide Issue. A variable to represent nonlabor inputs
other than beds was constructed by subtracting from nonlabor expense
the product (BEDS X 1000), where $1000 is an estimate of the annual
depreciation expense per bed on beds alone. Sensitivity of the results to
this assumption will be discussed below. Output was defined as the num-
ber of cases treated, as measured by the number of admissions. While
it would have been desirable to have an explicit measure of casemix,
such data were not available. Because the sample hospitals are the sole
hospitals serving relatively similar populations and are not major teach-
ing hospitals, variation in casemix is not likely to be great. The output
of the hospital is assumed to be a "treated case." Each case, it is as-
sumed, is treated to the same degree; quality is assumed to be unrelated
to input mix, and days of stay are assumed not to be of value in them-
selves. Fuchs has noted that it is not even clear whether additional days
of stay should be treated as beneficial, because they mean more bed and
board, or as detrimental, because they delay the patient's resumption
of normal activities.
4 The actual estimating equations were of the form
In ADMISSIONS = a0 + ft inBEDS + (3 2
inPERSNL + ft inMD
+ ft inNLIP + y TIME + u
where ADMISSIONS is inpatient admissions per year;
BEDS is short term beds available;
PERSNL is full-time-equivalent nonphysician
personnel;
MD is medical staff measures;
NLIP is a nonlabor inputs measure; and
TIME is time, measured from 1 to 7.28 Chapter Three
Results
Table 3.1 indicates the results using total patient care physicians
(MD) as a measure of physician input, and hospital full-time-equivalent
nonphysician personnel as a measure of the nonphysician labor input.
The coefficient on the physician input, the elasticity of admissions with
respect to the number of physicians in the county, is always significant,
at the 0.01 level or better, and in the range of 0.11 to 0.17.
5 Personnel
and nonlabor expense are likewise always significant. Measured hospital
productivity decreased during this period at a rate of about 3% per year.
It is likely that this decline in measured productivity captures increases
in the service intensity or style of care, especially since actual admissions
were increasing on average at these hospitals. The BEDS variable is
significant only for nonprofit hospitals; except for this difference, the
production function does not appear to differ across hospital types.
Not-for-profit hospitals above 100 beds and large hospitals overall dis-
play approximately constant returns to scale, while for all other hospital



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
subsamples, and for the full sample, the sum of coefficients is signifi-
cantly less than unity, indicating decreasing returns.
The most likely reason for the insignificance of beds is the high corre-
lation of this variable with personnel (r = .91). High multicollinearity
is to be expected in production function estimates; perhaps its existence
might also explain why Feldstein's results for British hospitals were
"unreasonable," with low or insignificant coefficients for such obviously
important inputs as nurses. Heteroskedasticity was anticipated, but did
not occur; error variances were almost identical for each quartile.
There is a potential problem in the estimates because of the possibil-
ity of excess capacity. The possibility of excess capacity in any of the
inputs is disturbing in any production function study. It is even more
disturbing here because the measured amount of the physician input
may well be correlated with the extent of excess capacity in the other
inputs. If it is supposed that hospitals may have excess capacity in the
hospital inputs (beds, personnel, and other nonlabor inputs), and if
physicians can in part create or activate demand for hospital care, then
it is possible that any observed increase in output related to the presence



















































































































































































NOTE: Rates are rates per 100 persons.
may not in fact reflect physician input productivity. Instead, we may
only be observing more intensive use of previously underutilized hospital
inputs. As noted in the preceding chapter, this problem cannot be fully
resolved without direct measurement of underused inputs. Even if physi-
cian inputs actually rise, the total change in hospital output would be
the sum of the direct effect of physician inputs, holding the utilization
or service flow of hospital inputs constant, plus the increase in output
arising from the greater flows of productive services from the hospital
inputs. There is, of course, some ambiguity in the notion of excess ca-
pacity, and some question of how to measure it and incorporate it into
production function estimates.
In order to determine whether the estimates presented above might
be affected by this excess capacity effect, it is useful to determine whether
the measured effect of physicians on output varies with the level of hos-
pital excess capacity. The lower the level of excess capacity, the closer
the coefficient on physicians will approximate the true output elasticity.
The average occupancy rate of all hospitals in the sample is about 70%.
A subsample of these hospitals with occupancy rates (in any year)
greater than 75% was selected.
6 The estimated production function is
shown in the second to last line of table 3.1. The values of coefficients31 Physician Influence on the Productivity of Hospitals
on all variables, including physicians, are practically unchanged from
the full sample results. These results suggest that the presence of excess
capacity does not bias the coefficient estimates. Of course, if additional
physicians mean no physician input, or if none of the hospitals ever
reaches a capacity constraint at any time during the year, then this argu-
ment does not hold. Neither of these suppositions seems plausible.
Finally, comparison of the first and last lines in table 3.1 indicates
that omission of the physician input did not bias estimates of returns to
scale. Omission of the physician input does, however, lead to an over-
estimate of both the effect of personnel on output and of the rate of
decrease in productivity over time. Adding the physician input makes
only a modest contribution to the explanatory power of the regression,
as might be expected given the high multicollinearity of the input vari-
ables.
Table 3.4 shows the result of a similar estimate using disaggregated
measures of physician input. (For each of these physician measures, a
constant (1) was added to prevent zero observations). The explanatory
power of the regression is not appreciably improved by this change, but
the results do shed some light on the way hospital output responds to
subspecialties.
7 (The coefficient on the time variable is almost the same
as in table 3.1, and so is omitted.) Not surprisingly, hospital based
specialists, uncommon in hospitals under 100 beds anyway, tend to
depress output there, probably because their presence is a proxy for case
complexity. Similarly, medical specialists (internists, pediatricians, etc.)
tend to affect output only in the large hospitals. Both surgical specialists
and G.P.'s have positive output elasticities everywhere. Interpretation
of the coefficients on G.P.'s and surgeons can be simplified by converting
the elasticities into marginal products per physician. Table 3.5 shows
that the marginal product of a physician is about 35 admissions per
year, or about 3 per month. As might be expected, the marginal product
is higher for surgeons than G.P.'s, and the difference tends to widen in
the larger hospitals and counties where specialization by surgeons may
occur to a greater extent. The purely hospital based physicians have a
high marginal product in the larger hospitals.
Since many of the measures of input used here are obviously very
crude, it seems appropriate to test the sensitivity of the results to alter-
native measures. Table 3.6 presents the results of such tests.
Output has been measured by the admission or case treated. I have
argued that "quality" or casemix is not likely to differ in a systematic
way across the sample hospitals, since the hospitals are stratified by size
and since the populations served are all from relatively rural midwestern
counties. One attempt to control for "quality" would be by introducing
the number of approvals (of education programs) and accreditations, as
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3 E'O33 Physician Influence on the Productivity of Hospitals
Table 3.5 Annual Marginal Admission Products, by Physician Specialty
Type, Evaluated at Mean
All Surg. Med. Other Hosp.
Subsample M.D.'s G.P.'s spec. spec. spec. based
Full sample 35.8 31.3 46.0 36.7 48.4
Beds>100 33.3 21.2 53.5 37.7 44.8 73.2
Beds 50-100 34.8 31.8 54.3
Governmental 32.6 32.3 60.5 48.3
Not-for-profit 38.9 32.0 32.8 28.9 95.9
NFP, Beds>100 34.7 20.6 34.7 68.3 76.1
NFP, Beds
50-100 44.1 39.9 62.6 98.7
Govt. Beds>100 30.1 23.7 63.6
Govt. Beds
50-100 27.9 27.0 56.0 —-
Occu.>75% 38.1 38.0 84.5 44.3
NOTE: = coefficient not significant or negative.
(line 1, table 3.6). While approvals were significant and positively re-
lated to admissions (somewhat unexpectedly), their inclusion did not
affect the production function coefficients nor contribute appreciably to
the explanatory power of the regression. The number of facilities was
not significant.
Measuring hospital labor input with the number of full-time-equiva-
lent personnel is obviously imperfect. One possible way to improve the
measure of labor input is to follow Feldstein's procedure with British
hospitals and use payroll expense. If personnel are heterogeneous, if
relative wages reflect relative marginal products, and if absolute wage
levels do not differ, the implicit weighting by wage rates should provide
a better input measure than does just counting all employees equally.
Even though there is no reason to suppose that quality-constant wage
levels are identical, the variation among this set of geographically homo-
geneous hospitals may not be too severe. Line 3 of table 3.6 shows the
result of replacing personnel with payroll. In general, using payroll
instead of personnel did not improve, and sometimes worsened, the
explanatory power of the regression. The only exception is in the case
of smaller not-for-profit hospitals. One other change was an increase
in the coefficient on beds.
A final test was to change the measure of annual bed cost used in
calculating nonlabor expense from $1000 to $3500. Except for the ex-
pected change in the relative magnitudes of the BED and NLIP coeffi-
cients, the results were unaffected.
Since it is unclear whether hospital outputs respond immediately to
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facilities, since the precise dating of when an input was actually avail-
able in questionable in the data, and since standard errors may be
understated owing to the presence of serial correlation in the pooled
time-series cross section, results were also obtained using seven-year
average values for each hospital for inputs and outputs. The results are
shown on line 5, table 3.6. The results are again very similar to the
pooled results of table 3.1, except that the beds variable is now insig-
nificant.
Length of Stay
Holding beds constant, the only ways physician input (or any other
input) can increase the number of cases treated are either by increasing
the occupancy rate or by reducing length of stay. Feldstein's results for
the United Kingdom strongly suggest that when output is increased by
increased medical input (or any other input), average duration of stay
declines but the occupancy rate is only slightly affected.
8 Does additional
physician input in this sample of U.S. hospitals also increase output
primarily by shortening stay? One way to tell is by including average
stay directly in the production function. One can either interpret this as
a "characteristic" of output which one may wish to hold constant, or as
another output of a multiproduct firm.
9
Line 2 of table 3.6 suggests that reductions in stay are an important
part of the way in which physicians contribute to output. The coefficient
of mean stay is negative and significant; its inclusion substantially im-
proves the R
2. The coefficient on MD's falls to about one-third of its
former value, the coefficients on personnel and NLIP fall by 25-35%,
while the coefficient on beds increases substantially. One possible con-
clusion is indeed that an important way in which physicians "produce"
admissions is by shortening the length of stay. It also appears that one
of the reasons why the effect of beds on admissions was relatively slight
is that beds produce bed-days, and that many of these additional days
show up as extended stays rather than as new admissions.
There are, of course, some other explanations which are consistent
with these results. One is that there are substantial differences in case
complexity, and complexity tends to be positively related to the number
of beds and negatively related to the number of physicians.
Another, perhaps more plausible explanation is indicated by Fuchs
in his review of Feldstein's book.
1
0 He suggests that length of stay may
vary for reasons other than medical input—regional differences in med-
ical practice, socioeconomic characteristics of patients and area, and so
on. If physician input primarily "produces" admissions, not days of stay,
while beds and (to a lesser extent) personnel do produce days of stay, a
consequence of reduced length of stay will be an increase in the ratio36 Chapter Three
of medical staff to hospital inputs, but the increased ratio does nothing
to cause the reduction in stay. This explanation would imply that there
was, in some sense, an "excess" of days of stay (at least in the sense of
their not being needed for the production of a treated case) when med-
ical input was less; it suggests that some hospital inputs cannot be sub-
stituted for medical inputs in the production of treated cases. With the
available data it is not possible to tell which interpretation is correct.
Optimal Input Ratios
If the hospital were to minimize cost for a given output, it would
choose that mix of inputs at which the ratio of regression coefficients
(output elasticities) just equalled the ratio of expenditures on the inputs.
(This statement assumes that inputs are purchased at constant prices.)
For those inputs for which dollar cost estimates are available—person-
nel, nonlabor inputs, and beds—the optimal ratios and the actual sample
mean input expenditure ratios are shown in table 3.7. For physicians,
the table shows the shadow price of a physician—the price per physician
which would yield an actual ratio of inputs equal to the optimal one.
A shadow price for physicians relative to all hospital inputs is also
obtained by calculating the price per physician which would produce
equality between the ratio of physician costs to hospital costs and the
ratio of the coefficient on physicians to the sum of all hospital input
coefficients.
There are two main messages from these computations. First, hospi-
tals tend to underuse personnel relative to nonpersonnel inputs—either
beds or other nonpersonnel inputs—in all but large nonprofit hospitals.
Second, the shadow price of the physicians' annual input into the pro-
duction of hospital output was in the neighborhood of $17,000 per year.
It was higher for not-for-profit hospitals than for governmental hospitals.
There are other costs that should be considered, if only the data were
available. To the extent that increased physician input shortens stays,
one should add to the opportunity cost of physician input the explicit
and implicit costs of home and other nonhospital inputs used to care
for the patient during out-of-hospital convalescence, but subtract the
opportunity cost of increased "sick time" that may accompany longer
stays.
Physicians do not, on average, spend all of their working hours at the
hospital. Instead, most physician working hours are spent in their offices,
treating and diagnosing ambulatory patients. How does this fact affect
the interpretation of the appropriate input mix?
Suppose for the moment that the ratio of average physician office
hours to hospital hours is constant across the sample hospitals. If what
the physician does in his office has no effect on the demand or supply of
admissions, if physicians allocate their time to equate net income per"3
=
138 Chapter Three
hour worked at every location, and if prices reflect consumer evalua-
tions, an appropriate measure of the opportunity cost of the time spent
per physician per year in the hospital would be average physician net
income per year times the average fraction that hospital hours are of
total working hours.
Even such measures are not easy to obtain, but the following calcula-
tions are probably reasonably accurate. Average physician net income
in nonmetropolitan locations was about $39,000 in 1969. For nonmetro-
politan physicians in 1969 hospital visits were about 25% of total pa-
tient visits. If one assumes equal time for hospital or office visits, this
suggests that physicians spend, on average, about one-fourth of the work
time at the hospital. If the average physician "wage" per visit is a legiti-
mate measure of his opportunity cost, that cost is about $9750 per year,
compared to a shadow price of $17,000 per year. The conclusion then
is that there is overuse of hospital inputs relative to physician inputs in
all hospitals taken together, and in all types of hospitals except small
governmental ones. The actual savings from moving to an optimal
physician-hospital input ratio in the average not-for-profit hospital in
the sample would be $144,000, or about 8% of total hospital expenses.
To this should be added the net costs (positive or negative) of con-
valescence out of the hospital owing to shorter stays. The relatively
greater overuse in not-for-profit hospitals, as compared to governmental
ones, is consistent with the notion that physicians may be able to control
not-for-profit hospitals more effectively than they can control govern-
mental hospitals, which at least have an identified political constituency.
Measures of Physician Input
As described above, the initial measure of physician input was the
number of patient care physicians in the county. The ideal measure of
physician input mH that we seek could be defined as
mH=h's•M
where M is the number of physicians in the county, s is the hospital's
staff of active physicians as a proportion of the total number of physi-
cians in the county, and h is the average number of hours per week
worked at the hospital by each staff physician. Since mH is measured by
M, there are several possible sources of error. I will argue that if the
estimates above are in error, they will tend to underestimate physician
productivity, and so tend to underestimate the overuse of hospital inputs.
Even if h, s, and M are uncorrelated, M will measure mH only with
an error. This raises the possibility of a standard errors-in-variables bias
toward zero. Moreover, if either h or s is correlated with M, the coeffi-
cient on M will be a biased measure of mH.39 Physician Influence on the Productivity of Hospitals
To adjust for such correlation, two things were done: first, data were
obtained on the number of physicians with staff appointments at each
of the 160 hospitals in late 1972 from the Social Security Administra-
tion's "Provider of Services" data. These data, obtained in the process
of Medicare certification, list the number of medical staff appointments
of various types. The Social Security Administration's survey also pro-
vides some more disaggregated measures of the type of personnel.
Physician staff members were divided into two groups: active staff
members, and all other staff members (courtesy, honorary, etc.). A
comparison of the results for 1972 using alternatively all county M.D.'s
and hospital staff members is shown in table 3.8. The coefficient on
physicians is only slightly lower when all county physicians are used
than when active staff members are used. When the sample is disaggre-
gated, it becomes apparent that, at least in 1972, there is considerable
downward bias in the coefficient estimate for larger hospitals when
physician input is measured by the total number of physicians in the
county, but there was no bias for smaller hospitals. There does seem to
be a little evidence, therefore, that overuse of hospital inputs may be
somewhat more severe than indicated above.
Second, it may be hypothesized that physician hospital hours and
numbers of physicians relative to hospital inputs might be inversely
correlated. At least, with demand held constant, the number of hours
worked in total by a physician may decline as the number of physicians
increases (either because price declines or because of some pro-rata
rationing effects). Moreover, as the number of physicians relative to
hospital inputs increases, each physician may spend less time at the
hospital. This is another reason to suspect that the estimates in table 3.7
may underestimate the overuse of hospital inputs.
One adjustment that can be made is to estimate the effect of physi-
cians with the physician-population ratio held constant. Physicians may
work shorter hours (at the hospital and in total) when they are plentiful
relative to the population or, as suggested by Reinhardt, the pace of
work may be less hectic. The physician-population ratio in this sense
may serve as a proxy for hospital hours per physician. However, when
the physician-population ratio (or its log) was entered in the regression,
it had a significant coefficient only for the small nonprofit hospitals
subsample, and the change there in the coefficient on MD's, while posi-
tive, was small.
Conclusion
The empirical results presented in this chapter suggest that, once a
patient is hospitalized, there will be some overuse of hospital inputs
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duction of hospital admissions, even while reducing the level of hospital
inputs, if additional physicians' time were added. The reduction in cost
of the hospital inputs thus saved would exceed the increase in costs
attributable to the additional physician inputs, at least if the social
costs are measured by the portion of physician net income coming from
time spent at the hospital. Whether these costs equal the social costs of
providing physician services is, of course, very uncertain, given the way
in which physician training is financed. Nevertheless, if these output
elasticities are accepted as measures of the effect of physician hospital
hours, and if the cost measure is taken as appropriate, the conclusion
is that the given stock of physicians could be used more efficiently if
physicians spent more time at the hospital and hospitals eliminated some
personnel and nonlabor inputs.
This is inefficiency in the direction opposite from that found by Rein-
hardt for office practices. However, it is by no means obvious that a shift
toward more physician-intensive production of hospital care would raise
physician utility, even though it would lower hospital and total costs.
Reductions in hospital costs reduce hospital insurance benefits. Depend-
ing upon the amount and type of physician fee insurance, the result may
be a decrease in physician utility. Here, at least, we have a reason why
resource misallocation occurs.
One message for policy is that what is likely to be important is the
relatively low marginal product of specialists, especially of surgeons.
Given the high cost of training surgeons, one may wonder whether the
hospital output, even if that output is thought to be appropriate in some
sense, justifies those costs. Of course, in practice, increases in physicians
are likely to be accompanied by increases in hospital inputs; the hospital
inputs mean more output, but also more cost.
Another message is that even primary care physicians—G.P.'s and
medical specialists—have a significant positive effect on hospital admis-
sions. If the goal is to increase the number of primary care physicians
without increasing the hospitalization rate, the analysis above suggests
that an appropriate strategy is to couple physician increases with hospital
input decreases.